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Abstract 
 
Wireless sensor networks represent a new generation of 
real-time embedded systems with significantly different 
communication constraints from the traditional networked 
systems. With their development, a new attack called a path-
based DoS (PDoS) attack has appeared.  In a PDoS attack, 
an adversary, either inside or outside the network, 
overwhelms sensor nodes by flooding a multi-hop end-to-
end communication path with either replayed packets or 
injected spurious packets. Detection and recovery from 
PDoS attacks have not been given much attention in the 
literature. In this article, we propose a solution using 
mobile agents which can detect PDoS attacks easily and 
efficiently and recover the compromised nodes. 
  
 
Keywords: Denial of Service Attack, Detection, Recovery, 
Sensor Networks 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are increasingly being 
deployed in mission critical applications, and for monitoring 
of critical events in areas such as national defense and 
homeland security applications for prevention and detection 
of nuclear, chemical and biological threats. Security issues 
related to deployment of wireless sensor networks in hostile 
environments are being investigated extensively. WSNs tend 
to be unstable and have limited resource capacity and so are 
vulnerable to DoS attacks.  
The path-based DoS attack was first described in detail 
and named by Deng et. al. in [5]. They pointed out that a 
PDoS attack, by exhausting the batteries of several nodes, 
has the potential to disable a much wider region than simply 
a single path due to the tree structure topology of a WSN.  
A standard PDoS attack begins with the compromise of 
member nodes and aggregator nodes which are then used to 
flood the intermediate and sink nodes with packets along the 
routing paths. The resulting excessive power consumption 
can lead to a quick death of a WSN because the nodes are 
unable to return to sleep mode in order to conserve power.  
Few authors have tackled the problem of PDoS attacks on 
a WSN. In this paper, we introduce a novel method of using 
mobile agents in the WSN which permits us to detect these 
attacks and also recover from them. To our knowledge, the 
only application of mobile agents in sensor networks to 
appear in the literature is in the paper [19], but these are not 
used for detection of or recovery from attack. The work in 
this paper extends recent work of the authors [12] on 
detection of PDoS attacks in WSNs. 
Our methods are described in detail in sections 3, 4 and 5. 
In section 6, we evaluate the usefulness of our techniques 
and in section 7, describe work which remains for future 
papers. 
      
2. Working Model 
 
We assume the WSN has a tree-structure topology, a 
single base station and four types of nodes as shown in 
Figure 1. A description of the node and base station 
functions can be found in [14].  
 
 
Figure 1. Tree Structure of a WSN 
 
The work of [19] demonstrates that mobile agents (MAs) 
are very useful in WSNs because of their ability to reduce 
network load, encapsulate protocols and are robust and 
fault-tolerant.  We therefore add an MA to the WSN (several 
may be added in a large system) and assume that there is no 
communication restriction between nodes and the MA and 
that the MA has sufficient power to run the algorithms we 
need. We assume that the base station and MA are trusted 
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and can never be compromised by attackers. In addition, in 
order to be usable in a malicious environment, we assume 
the node bootloader can not be compromised by the 
attacker. Our recovery method comprises three parts, as 
detailed in sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. In all cases, it is 
sufficient for the WSN to have a single MA. However, the 
use of several MAs in a large WSN will reduce recovery 
time. 
In order to distinguish between nodes which have been 
compromised and those which have not, we need to 
introduce a labeling for each node. We base this labeling on 
3-dimensional co-ordinates in space [18], which can be 
obtained by geographical location using triangulation. For 
example, a node whose coordinates are 59°Latitude, 
29°Longitude and height 2 metres has ID 59:29:2.  (If the 
WSN is operating within a constricted space, a different 
scale can be used for measuring.) We assume that nodes 
cannot be positioned in the same geographical location. 
In order to implement recovery when a substantial 
number of nodes has been compromised in a PDoS, we will 
focus on re-establishing network paths which have been 
destroyed. In order to do this efficiently, we assume that the 
MA, during the course of message sending across the 
network, has identified  those nodes which attract most 
traffic and are therefore critical to maintenance of the 
network. 
 
3. Detection Stage 
 
Several methods for detecting DoS attacks in general 
networks have been proposed. One solution [20] is to use a 
MAC admission control rate limit, so that the network can 
ignore excessive requests without sending expensive radio 
transmissions. This limit cannot drop below the expected 
maximum data rate the network supports, though. However, 
if the nodes fail in one area, it could lead to high traffic flow 
in another area, because the sender can select different paths 
to transmit the packets across thus avoiding dead nodes.  
More recently, en-route filtering schemes have been 
proposed for intermediate nodes to filter false data generated 
by malicious aggregator nodes as well as to detect intruders 
engaged in what we have termed PDoS attacks [21] [23]. 
The basic idea is that the intermediate nodes share some 
keys with the member nodes in a node group or cluster. 
Member nodes generate MACs for the reported data using 
the shared keys, and intermediate nodes can verify the 
MACs before forwarding packets. In the SEF scheme 
proposed by Ye et. al., the Bloom filter [21] is used to 
reduce the size of MACs and ensure their security. The 
intermediate nodes and member nodes use randomly pre-
distributed keys to generate and verify MACs. In this 
scheme, it is highly likely that the false data will be dropped 
by one of the intermediate nodes and will not reach the base 
station.  However, there are several problems with the SEF 
scheme. First, SEF uses a probabilistic approach. It cannot 
guarantee that every spurious packet will be filtered out on 
the path. In addition statistically, a spurious packet will be 
forwarded for a certain number of nodes before it is filtered 
out.  Second, the message overhead of SEF is still large. The 
size of the Bloom filter is 14 bytes long, which is about half 
of the data payload of a TinyOS packet.  
In the interleaved key scheme proposed by Zhu et. al. 
[23], member nodes and intermediate nodes set up 
interleaved keys using randomly pre-distributed keys. These 
interleaved keys and hop-by-hop authentication ensure that 
the base station will detect any false packets when no more 
than a certain number of nodes are compromised. The 
problem of the interleaved key scheme is that there is no 
efficient mechanism to authenticate two nodes to each other 
through multiple hops. In addition, the communication 
overhead of the pair-wise key establishment for multi-hop 
nodes is large, and the process is slow. 
Jing et. al. [5] developed a method of using one-way hash 
chains to protect end-to-end communications in WSNs 
against PDoS attacks. It prevents PDoS attacks from the 
intermediate nodes or from outside sources capable of 
launching PDoS attacks, since an adversary cannot generate 
the next valid OHC number, while replayed old OHC 
numbers will be dropped. Second, the memory and 
computational costs of OHC execution are quite lightweight.  
Third, this scheme tolerates packet losses.  But there are also 
some obvious disadvantages. One of them is it cannot 
constrain PDoS attacks by the compromised nodes in 
WSNs, especially the nodes which store the hash function. 
All of the work using MACS results in high local 
computing costs and subsequent death of nodes. The inter-
leaved key scheme has extremely high communication 
overhead. We therefore adapt the low cost one-way hash 
chain idea of Jing et. al., but efficiently employ a mobile 
agent to detect if the sender of the hash has been 
compromised. 
   Our detection solution includes a one-way hash chain, a 
traffic control algorithm, detection of node compromise and 
node failure and a voting algorithm. We choose the one-way 
hash chain as it has low computational requirements and is 
easy to deploy [5]. The one-way hash chain is used to detect 
any compromised node except for source nodes. We use a 
traffic control algorithm to detect the misbehavior of source 
nodes since the adversary could compromise them to access 
the one-way hash function. We also use message 
broadcasting from the MA to distinguish between node 
failure and node compromise, because node failure which is 
a technical problem rather than an attack could generate 
higher traffic flow in a local area or along some paths. 
Finally, a voting algorithm is used to decide whether 
suspicious nodes have been compromised based on the votes 
from their neighbour nodes. 
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3.1. Traffic Control Algorithm 
 
   When one node wants to send packets to its neighbour 
nodes, not only will it include a hash function value, but also 
it includes its node ID in order to let the MA recognize the 
source of packets and record them into a traffic table. In 
Table 1, for each 5 second interval, the number of packets 
passing through the corresponding node is given in the 
column. If the traffic in each interval is normal, that is, 
below a certain given threshold W, the MA will simply 
delete the contents of the table and refresh it for the next 
time-frame. If the traffic of certain nodes in the table is 
abnormal (i.e. is above W), the MA will take further steps to 
tell whether the node has failed or been compromised. 
 
Table 1. Number of packets for a given node in several 
time intervals. 
Node ID 0-5 
secs 
5-
10secs 
10-
15secs 
15-
20secs 
20-25 
secs 
21:34:1 22 43 72 32 45 
22:35:0 13 65 37 99 24 
24:30:2 87 55 32 40 14 
 
Our algorithm detects abnormal traffic by choosing a 
threshold W and counting the number of times the traffic 
through a specific node exceeds W in a fixed table. If this 
occurs more than say w times, the MA then considers the 
node to be compromised or failed, but cannot tell which.  
Both w and W need to be determined by experiment. Initial 
choices can be made, followed by adjustments. 
The procedure for Node Failure Detection is described in 
the next section. 
 
3.2. Detection for Node Failure 
 
Both node compromise and node failure can lead to 
abnormal traffic flow during a short period or in a localized 
area of a WSN. So we have to eliminate the node failure 
condition in order to make our Traffic Control algorithm 
work well. When the MA goes into PROCEDURE 
NodeFailureDetection, it will simply broadcast a check 
message to all the nodes in the WSN. The MA counts the 
number of acknowledgment (ACK) packets received and 
compares with the number of nodes which do not reply, in 
order to determine the failed nodes. Responding nodes 
include their IDs and this allows the MA to determine the 
IDs of the non-responding nodes. The MA concludes that all 
non-responding nodes have failed and reports this to a 
technical support team. 
 
3.3 Voting Algorithm for Node Compromise 
 
In this section, we now determine which of the nodes that 
did respond to the MA message are in fact compromised. To 
do this, we use the MA to broadcast a new random message 
at random times to all the responding nodes exhibiting 
abnormal traffic patterns. When these nodes receive this 
message, they will try to send the same message to their 
neighbor nodes. However, as described in the well-known 
Byzantine Generals Problem [11], compromised nodes will 
attempt to transmit conflicting information to other parts of 
the system. We base our voting algorithm on this fact: if 
node A receives the same message from node B and the 
MA, node A will vote that node B is not compromised and 
send back this voting result along with both IDs to the MA. 
When the MA has received a certain number of votes 
against a node, the MA will decide that node has been 
compromised. The MA now takes steps to recover the 
compromised node.   
    We can assume that the WSN has sufficient 
uncompromised nodes to make such a voting algorithm 
reliable. On the other hand, in very large-scale WSNs, there 
could be thousands of nodes, in which case several MAs 
could be applied in order to implement the detection 
algorithm. One advantage of using MAs is that they can 
provide seamless technology to a very big network. So there 
are no problems in deploying more of them into WSNs.   
     In addition, node compromise is a fairly slow process, as 
mentioned in [2] when detection and recovery methods are 
in place. Thus it is unlikely, that at any given time, more 
than half the nodes would be compromised. 
 
4. Response Stage 
 
    After detection, we need to assess the level of attack. Our 
response method is based on the number of nodes 
compromised. The MA will calculate the number of 
compromised nodes based on the voting results from sensor 
networks. When the MA receives all the voting results from 
the nodes, it will apply the response algorithm described 
below and make a decision on what level of recovery needs 
to be implemented. We assume that technical interference in 
the transmission of votes is kept to a minimum. 
     In determining an appropriate response, the one 
significant factor is the number of compromised nodes. The 
MA will choose a number Nmin below which the situation is 
deemed to be easy to manage and the compromised nodes 
quickly recovered. The MA will also choose a number Nmax 
above which the situation is extremely serious and 
extraordinary steps need to be taken. Between these two 
values a moderate approach to recovery will be used. In 
practical situations, these maximum and minimum values 
would be determined using experimental data.  
 
5. Recovery Stage 
      
     Before presenting our three recovery levels in detail, we 
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examine the literature on node recovery. 
    For a hardware-based solution, the Mica mote node [7] 
uses a coprocessor to reprogram the main processor, which 
ensures that the application can always be recovered. The 
eXtreme Scale Mote (XSM) [6] uses a timer to ensure that a 
bootloader eventually regains execution control. The XSM 
bootloader can detect a golden gesture – three manual resets 
in quick succession – and revert to a factory image. If the 
XSM’s timer fires, the node invokes a special management 
program which waits for commands to be issued but no 
automatic recovery mechanism exists. Because this type of 
hardware solution is expensive and hard to implement for 
different node type, we do not consider it in our setting. 
    Many software methods have been proposed for node 
recovery in WSNs. Some of the most recent are described in 
XNP [9] [4], MOAP [17], Kapur et. al. [15] [22] and Jeong 
et. al..  
 
5.1 Program-loaded Recovery 
      
     In each of the recovery stages, the speed of recovery is 
crucial in order to prevent the attack from moving to a 
higher level. 
     The program-loaded recovery approach is implemented 
when only a few nodes have been compromised. In this 
case, we have the MA reload the program into each 
compromised node. The aim is to reconstitute compromised 
nodes as quickly as possible. 
    Our method is based on Jeong et. al.’s work in that we 
compare the original block image with the current image 
and reload the difference. We do not reload if the images are 
identical. Our model only runs the “DOWNLOAD” 
command after the MA finds that there is a difference 
between two blocks (the malicious and original one). Due to 
the limitation on processing capacity, the nodes can not self-
program the chips. At the same time, too much energy 
consumption could make the nodes die earlier than 
necessary.  This recovery method is most suitable when only 
a relatively small number of nodes has been compromised 
because the block image comparison and download 
components are time consuming.   
     In detail, the process is as follows. The MA connects 
each compromised node (previously identified) with wired 
cable, downloads the current code and compares this code 
block by block with the original program of which it has a 
stored copy. (This is only practical for a very small number 
of nodes;  to deal with larger numbers, more MAs can be 
deployed.) Since the node has already been identified as 
compromised, we assume that there will be differences in 
one or more blocks. If fewer than half the blocks differ, the 
MA reloads the difference into the node. If half or more of 
the blocks differ, the MA reloads the full original code. At 
the same time, the MA analyzes the differences and 
produces appropriate security patches for the code (eg. 
short-term monitoring, message sending limitation); these 
are downloaded with the code. The security patches are 
designed to prevent the attack from escalating and they will 
be passed from node to node as the nodes communicate. 
     A copy of the original program of each of the four node 
types is stored in the MA block by block (for instance, one 
block may be 128bits). The MA keeps two hash tables: one 
is a checksum hash table used to compare the current 
program and malicious program easily; the other is an 
address hash table which records the location of the code 
block. 
     Figure 2 shows code divided into fixed block sizes and 
indicates the use of the checksum hash table in determining 
differences between blocks. The checksum pair is inserted 
into the hash table for look-up.  
     Recovery time for each node in this method is defined as 
the sum of the time of comparison for difference, the time to 
send a transmission command, the time to download and the 
reset time. Normally we do not count the development time 
for any security patch developed.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Block Comparison in Program-loaded 
Recovery 
 
5.2. Blacklist Recovery 
 
    In this situation, a medium number of nodes has been 
compromised. If the network is small, we can employ the 
program-loaded recovery method. In a larger network, in 
addition to reprogramming compromised nodes as described 
in section 5.1, we also prevent these nodes from 
compromising other nodes in the network. A key part of our 
approach is to use the paths along which the attacker is 
applying the PDoS. 
Blacklist recovery involves the development of a list of 
compromised node IDs (the blacklist). The MA implements 
the program-loaded recovery method and at the same time, 
it builds and maintains a blacklist of compromised nodes as 
these is detected using the detection method of section 3.3.  
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A node ID is deleted from the blacklist once the node has 
been recovered either by the technical team or by the MA. 
The MA then uses the blacklist to prevent compromised 
nodes from compromising additional nodes by sending the 
updated blacklist to all neighbours of nodes either added to 
or deleted from the list and follows this up with an 
acknowledgement request to ensure it was received. When a 
node receives a message from another node, it checks that 
node’s ID and if the ID is on the blacklist, does not accept 
the message. 
 Blacklist entries either expire or are deleted when the 
MA has detected normal traffic flow for several time 
intervals. A timer can be set up for expiration after an entry 
has been created in the blacklist table.  
    In anticipation of a greater number of nodes being 
compromised than can be suitably handled by this method, 
the MA also keeps a whitelist of node IDs which have never 
been suspect. The whitelist will be used in case it is 
necessary to move to the next recovery stage.     
The recovery time for each compromised node in this 
method can be simply defined as the sum of the time of 
blacklist generation related to verification of that node, the 
time of checking that the node is compromised, the time for 
repairing it and the reset time.  
 
5.3. Node-redundant Recovery 
 
    In this situation, the number of compromised nodes has 
moved above the threshold and we expect that very few 
paths are still available for operation in the WSN. Regaining 
control of random compromised nodes may not be sufficient 
to re-introduce critical pathways through the network. A 
quick and efficient recovery of network flow is required in 
this situation. 
    Our method is based on the redundant recovery concept 
described in [10]. As mentioned in our working model 
description, the MA has identified a number of nodes as 
being crucial to the maintenance of traffic flow across the 
WSN.  In recovery, the MA then first backs up the latest 
process image of any of these crucial nodes which have 
become compromised, and continues to give these nodes top 
priority for recovery. 
   The technical officers replace crucial compromised nodes 
if the power of the nodes is almost gone. After reparation 
and maintenance, the MA reloads the latest process image to 
the nodes.  At the same time, the MA closes down all nodes 
along fully compromised paths which cannot be maintained. 
    Recovery time for each node in this method can be simply 
defined as the total sum of the time for checking a 
compromised node, the time to repair a compromised node, 
the time to reset and the time for new node deployment.  
    When we calculate how many paths go through a node, 
we use the number of incoming paths and of outgoing paths. 
Let Ptotal be the number of paths going through each node. 
Let Pincoming be the number of incoming paths for each node. 
Let Poutgoing be the number of outgoing paths for each node. 
The following equation then holds: 
 
Ptotal = Pincoming * Poutgoing 
        
    This formula determines the level of importance of each 
node in a WSN and can be used by the MA to determine 
crucial nodes. 
In determining priority of recovery after the crucial nodes 
have been recovered, the MA can use the number of paths 
through each node as determined in the above equation. 
 
6. Evaluation 
6.1. Detection 
    
The simulation model was built around the cluster based ad 
hoc wireless network infrastructure described in [3]. The 
cluster infrastructure uses polling as the channel access 
scheme within each cluster, with code separation across 
clusters. The clusterhead polls each of the local nodes to 
allocate the channel. It was based on the Maisie/PARSEC 
simulation platform developed at UCLA [1]. For our 
simulation model we generate 50 nodes in a 200x200m 
square area. The radio transmission range is 40 meters and 
the data rate of the wireless link is 2Mbps.  The data traffic 
is generated by constant bit rate with an inter-arrival time of  
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Figure 3. Detection Time under Different Attack Rates 
 
25ms. For each node there are two transmission queues, one 
for control packets and one for data packets. The control  
queue is used for control packets such as route requests or 
recovery requests and it always has higher priority than the 
data queue. We also set up a timer if a packet has not 
reached the destination in 10 seconds. The packet length for 
data packets is 10k bits with 500 bits for the header 
message. The queue length for data packets is 50 for all 
nodes. The timer which is used to resend the message if 
there is no reply is set to 50ms.      
 Figure 3 compares the time to detect attacks between our 
method, the en-route filtering method and the SEF method. 
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We measure the detection time in seconds and the attack 
rate in SYN/sec. 
     As indicated, our method is significantly better than the 
others when the attack rate is between 17 SYN/sec and 28 
SYN/sec. 
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Figure 4. Energy Comparison on Detection 
 
Figure 4 shows the energy comparison between each 
detection method. Our method uses substantially less energy 
than the other methods. 
  
6.2. Recovery 
6.2.1. Program-loaded Recovery 
 
To evaluate the performance of the program-loaded 
recovery method, we use the BcastM.nc file from the 
TinyOS sensor system as a test scenario. This file is used to 
forward command messages that it receives to other nodes 
in the network. This is not a very long file but is sufficient to 
implement our experiment. Various changes can be made on 
the program code in order to set up the cases. 
We count the recovery time of the test set for each node. 
We do not consider the impact from the change of code. We 
take the following two cases as a test scenario: 
! Case 1: This is the case with the minimum amount of 
change on program code. We only modify constants in 
the program.  
! Case 2: This is the case with a major amount of change 
on program code. We add a few lines of code into the 
program and change the structure of some code. 
To evaluate the performance of this recovery method, we 
estimated and measured the recovery time and power 
consumption. We do not use reset time as it is always a 
fixed time period.  
Let Tcomparison be the time for comparison, Tcommand transmission 
be the time for command transmission, Tdifference download be 
the time for download and Emeasured be the energy 
consumption measured. 
  
 
Table 3.  Comparison between Our Method and 
Incremental Programming 
 Tcompa
rison 
Tcommand 
transmission 
Tdifference 
download 
Emeasured 
 
Our Method 259 189 47 78 
Incremental 
Programming 
274 241 49 134 
 
Table 3 compares our method with incremental 
programming [8]. Our recovery time is much less, especially 
for case 1. We use the MA to do the comparison work 
saving processing time on nodes. Our copy time is also 
lower than that in [8].  
 
6.2.2. Blacklist Recovery 
 
    The goal of this experiment is to understand the costs of 
our recovery mechanism, and see if it is feasible for sensor 
network recovery. We evaluate this recovery method by 
testing the time for blacklist generation, Tblacklist generation, 
because the times for checking and repairing, Tcheck and 
Trepairing, can involve such things as technician support. 
Tblacklist generation includes the read time from the node array, 
blacklist algorithm running time and write time to record 
into the blacklist. In our experiment, we set up blacklisting 
lower thresholds of 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 90% in a 10-
node WLA determining how many nodes have been 
compromised. The objective is to see how well the method 
works at each of these lower threshold levels. We test the 
reliability of network links in each case as follows. One 
node, A, is given top priority for maintenance and is 
assumed to be always reliable (never on the blacklist). Each 
node in the WSN generates one packet every two seconds. 
Node A broadcasts a message to detect compromised nodes. 
At the same time, we measure the power consumption for 
blacklist broadcast. Whether it is in an acceptable range is 
also important to our recovery system. We test it by using an 
MICA2 mote connected to a multimeter in order to obtain 
the power consumption after broadcasting the blacklist to its 
neighbour nodes. Figure 6 shows the power consumption on 
different blacklist thresholds. 
Upon analyzing the experimental data, we found that on 
average 99.6% of traffic going through compromised nodes 
had been blocked after 20 trial experiments. This method 
can protect the nodes from being compromised efficiently as 
shown in Figure 7. But it could also lead to abnormal local 
traffic flow. We found that a lower blacklist threshold of 
less than 50% of nodes will be recoverable in reasonable 
time 
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Figure 6. Packet Delivery Rate at Different Blacklisting 
Thresholds 
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Figure 7!Power Consumption on Blacklist Recovery 
 
with a single MA. This is based on levels of power 
consumption and recovery time after 30 trial experiments. 
Otherwise, the network needs to employ more than one MA 
to complete the recovery. 
     As we see from simulation results in Figure 7, at low 
blacklisting thresholds, the network only uses an extremely 
low power to send and receive the data packets. As the 
number of blacklisted nodes increases, there are more active 
periods on the working nodes, thus consuming more energy.  
However compared with the total power consumption of a 
WSN, this is much less compared with the power 
consumption on the normal function of nodes [16]. 
  
6.2.3. Node-redundant Recovery 
 
    In the simulation, we did not test the recovery time on 
deploying backup nodes into the current wireless sensor 
network. If there is no available path in a WSN, we can try 
to set up at least one available path to keep the network 
working. Based on the algorithm we used to find the most 
important node for each round, we can measure the time to 
find that node by running the algorithm on one node to get 
the time of calculating the number of paths. We simulated 
the situation that an aggregator node is set up with its direct 
neighbor nodes, and measured the number of paths going 
through this node during the available path retrieval. There 
are in total 20 nodes which include one aggregator node, 13 
member nodes and 6 neighbor nodes. This means we have 
13 incoming paths and 6 outgoing paths. We can calculate 
the time of running the algorithm on the member nodes and 
intermediate nodes. We also set up the network with 34 
nodes including 24 member modes and 10 intermediate 
nodes, 48 nodes including 33 nodes and 11 intermediate 
nodes, and 69 nodes including 47 member nodes and 22 
nodes.  
From the experiment, we found that times are 13.3 ms, 
23.1 ms, 32.9 ms and 47.6 ms respectively for the 20 node,  
 
 Figure 8. Time to set up available paths based on 
different number of nodes 
   
34 node, 48 node and 69 node cases to locate at least one 
available path in the WSN. We simulated the available path 
setup time with sensor networks of different density. We see 
that the setup time of the available path linearly increases as 
the size of the sensor networks increases. In addition, we 
take into consideration the travel time of the MA, the 
processing time of the MA and the number of MAs used in 
this recovery.  See Figure 8.  
We found that the time needed to locate an available path 
depends on the number of compromised nodes on that path. 
More nodes on the path lead to more retrieval time. 
Therefore, the recovery time depends on the number of 
nodes on that path needed to be retrieved. It is a good idea to 
deploy the new nodes for urgent recovery when most of the 
nodes are compromised. 
Time to set up available paths based on different number of nodes
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 20 40 60 80
Number of Nodes 
Ti
m
e 
to
 S
et
 U
p 
A
va
ila
bl
e 
Pa
th
s (
m
s)
 
1642
Authorized licensed use limited to: DEAKIN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. Downloaded on May 27, 2009 at 01:25 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
    We have presented a new detection and recovery method 
for node compromise in PDoS attacks in a WSN and 
evaluated our results, based on small WSNs, including 
comparison with other work. Our work demonstrates the 
feasibility of full recovery methods when few nodes have 
been compromised and prevention of further disintegration 
when many nodes have been compromised.  
    In future work, we will implement these detection and 
recovery methods in large-scale WSNs and extend the role 
of the MA in the detection and recovery procedures.  
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